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Abstract: Under normal conditions, human subjects experience the self within the lim-
its of the physical body and the limits of the present time. This unified experience of the
self in space and time has been challenged by philosophers and physicists. The spatial
unity between self and body has also been challenged by a well defined group of experi-
ences called “autoscopic phenomena” (AP), during which subjects have the impression
of seeing a second own body in extrapersonal space. Yet, with respect to the three
main forms of AP — autoscopic hallucination, heautoscopy, and out-of-body experience
— previous studies have concentrated on describing the spatial unity between self and
body while neglecting to analyze the temporal unity of self and body.
Here we describe several AP-cases with an altered experience of age or time for one’s own
body or self. In some AP-cases the second own body was seen as being younger or older
than the subject’s actual body. We show that the second own body is experienced as
if “coming from another time” although the observing self is experienced in the present
time. Other AP-subjects reported a feeling of timelessness of the observing self without
any age difference between the subjects’ actual and illusory body. We argue that these
differences in age or time suggest that the temporal experience of one’s own body and
self is altered in these subjects.
Collectively, these data suggest that AP may be associated not only with abnormal
sensations with respect to spatial unity, but also with respect to temporal unity. More-
over, we found that out-of-body experiences were associated with feelings of timelessness
and no age differences between self and body and that autoscopic hallucinations and
heautoscopy were associated with age differences between self and body but not with
feelings of timelessness. We conjecture that out-of-body experiences are characterized
by disembodiment not only in space but also in time. For autoscopic hallucinations
and heautoscopy our findings suggest that the spatial displacement between self and
body (without disembodiment) is accompanied by a temporal displacement of the body
to a different time period than the present. We discuss these abnormal experiences of
the bodily self in time and space and propose their potential functional and anatomical
mechanisms.
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The self as an entity distinct from other human conspecifics may be de-
scribed as an enduring and spatial entity (i.e. the feeling that one is the
same person across time and space) to which certain mental events and
actions are ascribed (i.e. the feeling of agency; being author of one’s own
thoughts and actions) and which is distinct from the environment [1]. More-
over, humans experience themselves to be located in a specific moment
(“the present moment”) and in a specific place (“the present place”) [2].
Bermudez [3,4] suggested to define such a fundamental behaviour [5] in
space and time as “non-conceptual”, proposing that the behaving agent
does not possess the concepts required to be aware of the contents of space
and time.a
The many concepts of “self” have been influenced by theology, philoso-
phy and psychology [6–9], but also by clinical observations from neurology
and psychiatry [1,10–13]. Thus, several clinical conditions have been de-
scribed during which the spatial or temporal self location is disturbed. With
respect to spatial self location, experiences occurring in microgravity such
as the inversion illusion during space missions or during the low gravity
phase of parabolic flights (an spatial disorientation illusion in which pilots
at least temporarily feel as though they are inverted relative to the earth;
this illusion can be caused either by gravitoinertial forces or by visual fac-
tors; [14–16]) and the room tilt illusion (a transient tilt perception of the
extrapersonal visual space on its side or upside down, with respect to a sta-
ble observer might be mentioned. Both experiences have also been reported
in neurological and otological patients [17–19]). When referring to distur-
bances of temporal self location, authors have mentioned conditions such as
delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS), which include among other
reduplifications the reduplification of oneself in time [20,21]. Another clin-
ical condition during which temporal self location is disturbed are spon-
taneous confabulations (i.e. acting on the basis of previous habits rather
than currently relevant memories). These patients have been reported to
produce confabulations about themselves that are composed of elements
of past true events, present actions and future imaginations [22,23]. Es-
pecially relevant to our present investigation about spatial and temporal
self processing is the group of clinical phenomena of autoscopic phenomena
(AP). AP are generally defined as illusory visual experiences during which
the subject has the impression of seeing a second own body in extraper-
aSuch subject-effected mental states are found in non-linguistic behavior and sub-
personal computational constructions (like the Chomskyan approach to syntax) [3].
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sonal space associated with varying degrees of separation of the self from
the body. [10,13,24,25]. Thus, it has been argued that AP challenge our
notions about the experienced spatial unity of self and body, localization
of the self, as well as agency [8,26]. Interestingly, in some of these cases it
has been reported that the autoscopic body (i.e., one’s reduplificated body
that is seen during the AP) is experienced as having a different age than
the observing subject. Other AP-subjects have also reported a feeling of
“timelessness” or changes in the experience of time. Thus, AP seem to
challenge common conceptions of our experience of self location not only
in space as commonly thought and analyzed, but also in time. The present
review analyzes how body and self during AP are experienced with respect
to temporal characteristics.
2 Autoscopic Phenomena — Illusions of Body and Self in
Space and Time
During most AP a fundamental component of the self is isolated, as the self
is not experienced as residing within the limits of one’s body. Therefore it
has been argued that AP present a valuable advantage to the study of the
self [13,27–29]. Nevertheless, during the last century studies of AP are still
rare in the neurological and scientific literature [10,13,30–35].
Three distinct forms of autoscopic phenomena have been defined (Fig. 1):
(1) Autoscopic hallucination (AH): the experience of seeing a “double” of
oneself in extrapersonal space viewed from the own physical body, i.e. in
an AH the subject feels his “self” or center of awareness within the phys-
ical body [10,13,34]. (2) Out-of-body experience (OBE): the experience
or feeling that the center of awareness is located outside of the physical
body. The subjects experience seeing their body and the world from an
elevated extrapersonal location that differs from their habitual position.
Their perceptions are thus organized in such a way as to be consistent with
this elevated visuo-spatial perspective [13,32,33]. (3) Heautoscopy (HAS):
an intermediate form between AH and OBE. During HAS the subject also
sees his double in extrapersonal space, but it may be difficult for the subject
to decide whether he is disembodied or not or whether the self is localized in
the physical or the double’s body. In addition, subjects may experience the
world from two simultaneous or alternating visuo-spatial perspectives: the
habitual physical visuo-spatial perspective and an additional extracorporal
perspective [13,35]. Despite of the association of AP with a wide range of
neurological diseases such as epilepsy, migraine, neoplasm, infarction, and
infection [33,34], they have also been reported in the general population, in
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Figure 1. Phenomenology of Autoscopic Phenomena (AP). a) Autoscopic hallucination
(AH): experience of seeing one’s body in extracoporeal space (as a double) without dis-
embodiment (experiencing the self as localized outside one’s physical body boundaries).
The double (right figure) is seen from the habitual egocentric visuo-spatial perspective
(left figure). b) Heautoscopy (HAS): intermediate form between autoscopic hallucination
and OBE; the subject experiences to see his body and the world in an alternating (or
simultaneous) fashion from an extracorporeal and his bodily visuo-spatial perspective;
often it is difficult for the subject to decide whether the self is localized in the double
or in one’s own body. c) Out-of-Body Experience (OBE): During an OBE the subject
appears to “see” himself (bottom figure) and the world from a location above his physi-
cal body (extracorporeal location and visuo-spatial perspective; top figure). The self is
localized outside one’s physical body (disembodiment). The directions of the subject’s
visuo-spatial perspective during the AP is indicated by the arrows. Solid line represents
the subject’s point of view, dash line represents the “double”.
approximately 10%, where they occur only once or twice in a lifetime [27].
The above classification refers to AP by systematically describing the
experienced position of one’s body and self in spatial terms. Yet, one could
not only analyze where the subject experiences the double (or autoscopic
body) to be localized (i.e. in a different location in extrapersonal space with
respect to the experiencing subject), but also when in time the subject
experiences the double to be localized (i.e. is the double experienced as
being younger or older than the subject; is the double localized in the
present or not). In fact, there have been reports that the autoscopic body
looks older or younger than the actual body of the subject during the AP
and subjects have described these doubles to “come” from the past (younger
double) or from the future (older double). Other subjects have not reported
age-differences between autoscopic and physical body, but rather feelings
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of timelessness during the AP. As age-differences between autoscopic and
physical body and feelings of timelessness in subjects with AP have not
been systematically analyzed we decided to carry out such an analysis in
the present study.
3 Neuro-Phenomenology
This chapter describes 20 cases of APs from the literature with abnor-
malities in the experience of time with respect to the patient’s body and
self. We quote and summarize the description of each subject and classify
the experience with regard to spatial and temporal body and self location.
Our analysis includes AP-cases from neurology and psychiatry, as well as
healthy subjects.
3.1 Sivadon ([36], observation no. 1; HAS, AH)
A 50 year-old patient with influenza. In his first autoscopic experience he
reports:
He became “two men: one who is walking and another who is
lying on his bed and watches the other man”. He knew him-
self perfectly and was not surprised. Some days afterwards he
had another experience: “I saw in front of me a young man,
nevertheless without strength, trying to get dressed, putting on
his clothes with uncoordinated movements. And slowly I rec-
ognized myself in this silhouette, I recognized my hair and my
face”.b
In the second event this patient saw a young man in front of him. He did
not recognize this young man immediately as he himself. He noticed the
“painful” behaviour of his double, and characterized it as “half-sleeping”.
We classified this experience as AH since the autoscopic body appears in
front of the subject, with no depersonalization [10], and no disembodiment
or floating as in OBE. The first experience of the patient was classified
as heautoscopy, since he had experienced himself simultaneously as “two
men”.
3.2 Lhermitte ([37]; AH)
A middle-aged man recovering from a severe myocardial infarct.
Several days after the infarct the patient revealed a dream which
bCases 3.1 – 3.4 have been translated by the authors.
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he saw himself walking effortlessly. Suddenly he found himself
in the presence of a person who turned his back on him, but he
immediately recognized him, since this person was he himself;
he himself but old, broken, bent like the elders, with worn-out
clothes and an uncertain gait. “I said to myself, counting my
disease, ‘like you here become old and handicap on the doorstep
to the grave you are going to finish miserably’”.
The patient emphasizes the old age of his double, which he interprets as a
clue to his destiny, caused by the disease. It is not clear if this experience
occurred during dreaming, as a hypnagogic or hypopompic hallucination or
during wakefulness. However, the description is of AH as the patient sees
his double from the original body’s point of view, with no disembodiment
or depersonalization. Despite of the age difference and the back-view, the
patient immediately recognizes the double as himself.
3.3 He´caen and Ajuriaguerra ([31], observation no. 78; AH)
A 45 years old man with post traumatic stress disorder, without known
brain damage or physiopathology. He describes his autoscopic experience:
“I am sitting at a table, and I have beside me or in front of me,
another self [moi-meˆme], who sits down and actually speaks to
me, this is my double, I have the impression to see him mate-
rializing before me, in general this double speaks to me to tell
me that I have messed up my life, and he calls me “you”, he
sits in the chair in front of my desk [. . . ] I had the impression
of seeing myself in a mirror, he thought like I did, but criticized
me heavily, I have the impression that this is somebody else who
knows me well, it is not me in front of me, but physically it is
the same [. . . ] he has the same voice like me, but as younger, it
seems to me as if he is younger than me. At this moment I had
the impression to be in a situation like if I was in an unreal play
[. . . ] In these moments I believed the reality of the double”.
The double is explicitly described as being younger than the patient. The
double is speaking to the subject, and his younger voice is the first clue
for the patient concerning the age differences between the autoscopic and
physical body. Despite the immediate recognition, internally the subject
feels strange to the personality of the double. We classified this experience
as AH, since the “double” is described as “separated” from the body and
there is only a weak affinity between the physical and autoscopic body. Also
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there is no description of depersonalization or disembodiment. The patient
refers to mirror reflections to describe his experience of the autoscopic body,
as has also been employed by other patients with AH (i.e. [38–40]). The
subject is sitting in his chair, and so is the double.
3.4 Schmidt ([41]; AH)
A woman of 35 years old, epileptic. At the moment when she
woke up from a seizure, the patient saw [. . . ] in front of her
somebody who looked exactly like herself “like she was com-
pletely young and charming” who ran away, laughing. She tried
to catch her, but failed and fell down.
This short passage describes an appearance of a younger autoscopic body,
who runs away from the physical body. The experience is of AH as the
patient experiences neither depersonalization nor disembodiment and sees
her double in front of her. The double is exactly like the patient but
“completely young”. The double is in standing position, running away
from the patient. The patient is trying to run after her young double.
3.5 Green ([42]; 11 OBE-cases)
37.3% of Green’s healthy OBE-subjects reported a change in their experi-
ence of the passage of time. This change was mostly described as if time
did not exist or as if time passed more slowly or faster than usual. These
abnormal experiences of time might overlap to a certain extent. Below we
give the eleven cases that Green [42] has described.
1. “While I was out of my body there was no time at all, but
once I had regained myself I realized the experience had taken
few seconds.”
2. “I omitted to mention the actual time that this experience
took. It could have been minutes or hours, there was no sensa-
tion of time.”
3. “I had no idea of time.”
4. “There was a sense of ‘timelessness’.”
5. “The sensation was of a ‘frozen instant’.”
6. “Time seems to stand still.”
7. “Time ceases to exist.”
8. “I did not notice the passage of time at all: I think it was
either completely suspended or so slow as to be almost imper-
ceptible.”
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9. “I was climbing a hard new route when a big block that I
was holding on to came off and I fell down 90’ [. . . ] on that
occasion I felt that I was watching from below and time seemed
to pass very slowly.”
10 “I loose all sense of time completely and feel afterwards that
it has lasted hours but actually it is only a few minutes.”
11. “It all seemed to take long time but it could be one second
or less, because things go with the speed of light.”
Of the eleven subjects reported by Green, 63% (n=7) mention a feeling of
’timelessness’, 18% (n=2) report an experience of slowing of time-passage,
and 9% an experience of accelerated time (n=1). 9% (n=1) combine the
two experiences with slowing of time following timelessness. Also note
that in case 9, the experience of slowing of time was closely associated
with disembodiment (“watching from below”). Thus the disturbance of
the spatial and temporal unity between body and self were associated. No
age differences were reported between autoscopic and physical bodies.
3.6 Moody ([43], case 1; OBE)
Moody claims that “almost everyone [of his subjects] remarks upon the
timelessness of this out-of-body state [. . . ] time was not really an element
of their experience as it is in physical life”, as in the following report:
I lost control of my car on a curve and the car left the road
and went into the air [. . . ] at that point I kind of lost my
sense of time and I lost my physical reality as far as my body
is concerned — I lost touch with my body. My being or my self
or my spirit, or whatever you would like to label it, I could sort
of feel it rise out of me, out through my head. And it wasn’t
anything that hurt, it was just sort of like a lifting and being
above me [. . . ] it seemed then as though time were standing
still. At the first and the last of the accident, everything moved
so fast, but this one particular time, sort of in between, as my
being was suspended above me and the car was going over the
embankment, it seemed that it took the car a long time to get
there, and in that time I really wasn’t to be involved with the
car or the accident or my own body. . .
This description includes two characteristic elements of OBEs, disembod-
iment and elevated visuo-spatial perspective, but not explicit mentioning
of autoscopy. The feeling of timelessness, described in the beginning of the
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experience, becomes in the continuation a feeling of tremendous slowness of
the passage of time or fastness of the march of events. Also note that the
experience of timelessness closely associated with disembodiment. Para-
phrasing the patient we could say that he lost touch with his body and
time. No age differences were reported between autoscopic and physical
body.
3.7 Moody ([43], case 2; OBE)
When I came out of my physical body it was like I did come
out of my body and go into something else [. . . ] I can’t describe
it. I was more fascinated with everything around me, seeing my
own body there [. . . ] and all this seemed to go so quickly. Time
wasn’t really an element — and yet it was. Things seem to go
faster after you get out of your body.
The subject describes all three elements of an OBE, extracorporal visuo-
spatial perspective, disembodiment, and autoscopy. With respect to time,
we see again the combination of timelessness (“time wasn’t really an ele-
ment”) with the fastening of the events’ passage or slowing of time as here.
Again the subject notes that spatial and temporal characteristics between
self and body interact by stating that “things seem to go faster after you
get out of your body”. No age differences were reported between autoscopic
and physical body.
3.8 Devinsky et al. ([24], case 9; AH)
A 32 years old man had simple and complex partial seizures
followed by generalized tonoclonic seizures since the age of 8
years. After initial control of 8 years the seizures recurred at
age 16 years. The first episode of autoscopy had occurred at
this time. The patient described the episode, saying “suddenly,
I saw myself about five feet in front of me. My double was
mowing the lawn, which is what I should have been doing.” He
has subsequently experienced autoscopy 15 times. His double
is always a transparent, full figure that is slightly smaller than
life size. It often wears different clothing than the patient and
doesn’t share the patient thoughts or emotions. The double is
engaged in an activity that the patient feels he should be doing,
and he says, “that guy is my guilty conscience”.
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Unlike most of Devinsky et al.’s patients, who mentioned seeing their double
in the same clothing they wear at the event, here the clothing is different.
The difference in the clothing is a clue to the different age of the patient
and his double.c We suggest that the age of the autoscopic body might
rather be slightly older than the physical body as the patient experiences
the double carrying out activities that the patient feels he should be doing
(in the future). The patient relates his guilty conscience as the cause of
the double’s appearance. The episode described here is classified as AH, as
the patient describes seeing a double in front of him, while there is neither
disembodiment, nor depersonalization.
3.9 Blackmore ([44]; OBE)
OBEs may also be part of Near-Death-Experiences (NDEs) [43,44]. Next to
OBEs, NDEs may also be characterized by a feeling of joy and peacefulness,
the experience of passing through a tunnel, seeing of a light, a review of
the person’s life, and the return to life after the NDE. In addition, there
might be an experience of timelessness. Blackmore describes 3 OBE-cases
with such an experience of timelessness.
1. “I had an NDE type experience complete with the tun-
nel and light, out-of-body travels, expansion and contraction
of size, timelessness, a mystical experience and the decision to
return. . . ” (p. 43)
Another NDE subjects report:
2. “It was like I lost time.”
3. “I found myself in a space, in a period of time I would say,
where all space and time was negated.”d
With respect to timelessness Blackmore summarizes: “There can be a
strange sense of timelessness in which everything happens very fast al-
though time is not passing, or a sense that there is not even any order to
time any more”. Here, the first two cases describe their temporal experi-
ence as timeless. The third case describes experiencing a fast passage of the
events. No age differences were reported between autoscopic and physical
bodies.
cDouble’s clothing helped identifying OTE experience in other reports; see case 3.10
below; [32,34].
dIt is not mentioned if these latter two had also OBEs, thus were not included in the
statistics as different cases.
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3.10 Blanke et al. ([13], patient 5; HAS)
This patient, 43 year-old male, was known for familial hemiplegic migraine.
Associated neurological symptoms were noticed since he was 19 years old.
During his hospitalization he presented a complex partial seizure that was
associated with AP:
The patient sits while a nurse is inserting a venous catheter to
his arm. Suddenly he has the feeling that “it is all finished now.
She will kill me”. This was associated with a feeling of backward
rotation of his body (accompanied with nausea and trembling).
He had the feeling of seeing the world from two points of view:
the original one and the rotated one. Towards the end of the
rotation he suddenly noticed a presence of a person behind the
nurse. Immediately he identified him as himself: “he looked like
myself, but ten years younger. He was not dressed as I was.
He hadn’t the catheter, glasses and watch”. He perceived the
double as a real body in the extrapersonal space who comes
to help him, and was deeply relived by his appearance. The
double asked the original body “what am I supposed to do?” His
response was: “help me get away from here; these people want
to kill me!” then, a nurse and a doctor ran towards the patient.
Here the double became active, and have been fighting with the
doctor. Finally, the patient noticed a big black woman coming
from behind, and physically inclines the chair backwards. He
lost contact with his double and was put in bed by the medical
staff.
The appearance of the double from the past is suggested by his looks,
his clothing, his behavior and the absence of the catheter and watch of the
patient. The double comes from the past, looks as in the past, but acts in
the current situation . The patient’s experience is HAS as he sees the world
simultaneously from two points of view. The double is active and fighting.
A feeling of trembling accompanies the experience, and a sense of relief.
There is a dialogue between the double and the “I”, or, at least, there is a
mental communication which is perceived as a speech.
4 Discussion
We have analyzed 20 cases of APs in whom the temporal location of body
or self was abnormal. 25% of cases (n=5) were classified as AH, 5% (n=1)
were classified as HAS and the majority (70%; n=14) as OBE (Tab. 1). Our
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findings show that the unitary experience of self and body during AP is not
only abnormal with respect to unity in space (self is localized in the body
under normal conditions) but also (in the analyzed cases) with respect to
unity in time (self is localized in the present under normal conditions). In
addition, we found systematic differences in the temporal disunity between
AH/HAS as compared to OBEs. In the following we will discuss that
AP not only challenge the unified experience of the self in time, but that
they also allow to formulate more precise research hypotheses about the
functional and neural mechanisms that participate in the construction of
“self” across time.
All analyzed OBE-subjects had a feeling of timelessness or changes in
the experience of time such as acceleration or slowing of time without any
age differences between autoscopic and physical body. The disembodied
subject (or self) during an OBE thus seems to experience seeing the own
body from a “timeless” location or a location that is “out-of time”. Accord-
ingly, we have named this phenomenon “out-of-time experience” (OTE).
Interestingly, this suggests that in phenomenological terms the spatial co-
ordinates of the self (with respect to the body) and the temporal aspects
of the self (with respect to the present) share important characteristics.
Namely, the experience of being outside one’s body is associated with the
experience of being “outside” the present. This suggests that experience of
the self in space and time might share functional and neural mechanisms,
and temporal self mechanisms are influenced by spatial self mechanisms (or
vice versa; see below).
With respect to AH/HAS the analyzed cases did not experience time-
lessness but experienced their physical body at the present moment. Yet,
during AH/HAS the autoscopic body was either experienced as older than
the physical body (“as if coming from the future”; 33.3%), or as younger
(“as if coming from the past”; 66.6%). Based on these data we suggest that
the self in AH/HAS is experienced as being in the present and that the dou-
ble (or autoscopic body) is experienced as being displaced into the future
(older autoscopic body) or the past (younger autoscopic body). Again, this
suggests that in phenomenological terms the spatial and temporal aspects
of the self share important characteristics. Namely, whereas the self is ex-
perienced as being embodied and as being in the present, the (autoscopic)
body is experienced as being in extrapersonal space and as coming from
past or future.
In the following we try to account for the disturbed experience of tempo-
ral aspects of self and body in AP with respect to the cognitive and neural
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Figure 2. Temporo-parietal Junction. This brain region is supposed to be responsible
to the integration of multisensory inputs and to self-processing, thus to creation of fun-
damental mental contents as agency, self-other distinction and self-location in time and
space. Disturbance of the activity in this region may lead to AP, sometimes accompanied
with OTE.
mechanism that have previously been described for AP. Yet, before propos-
ing a model for disturbed experience of self and body in AP with respect
to temporal aspects, we quickly resume what is known about it with re-
spect to spatial characteristics. Studies suggest that in AP the integration
of multisensory information of one’s body (such as visual, tactile, propri-
oceptive, and vestibular information) has failed [10,13,29]. Such a failure
might lead to the experience of seeing one’s body in a position that does not
coincide with its felt position as proposed for the effected body part in su-
pernumerary phantom limbs [11,45]. It was further hypothesized that there
are several brain areas, and especially the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)
[13,26,29], that are responsible for the integration of the above mentioned
multisensory information as well as self-processing data. When this area
is disturbed either by pathology or by mental imagery this might facilitate
the occurrence of AP [25,29]. Several neuropsychological and neuroimag-
ing studies corroborate the important role of the TPJ (Fig. 2) and other
cortical areas along the intraparietal sulcus in combining these tactile, pro-
prioceptive, and visual information in a coordinated reference frame [46],
in body perception [47–49], and in mental imagery with respect to one’s
own body [25,50,51]. The TPJ has also been involved in cognitive functions
that are closely linked to self processing and AP: egocentric visuo-spatial
perspective taking, agency and self-other distinction (the capacity by which
one distinguishes between oneself and other particulars) [52]. Furthermore,
the TPJ is the classical lesion site in patients with visuo-spatial neglect
[12], a clinical condition, which has been shown to disturb the patient’s
egocentric spatial relationship with extrapersonal space and visuo-spatial
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perspective taking [53]. Neuroimaging studies in healthy observers have
also revealed activation of the TPJ during egocentric visuo-spatial per-
spective changes [54,55]. Although many other cortical areas have been
shown to play a role in self-processing, the reviewed neuroimaging data on
body and self-processing as well as the clinical data on APs suggest that
the TPJ is a key neural locus for self processing that is involved in mul-
tisensory body-related information processing as well as in processing of
phenomenonological and cognitive aspects of the self. Thus, disturbance
or lesion in this area might evoke AP [13,25,29]. Collectively, these studies
have therefore shown a strong link of the TPJ for processing with respect
to spatial self location. Yet, the TPJ has also been shown to play a central
role also in time-processing [56–58]. In the following we will briefly review
what is known about the TPJ with respect to temporal processing. We will
then try to apply these findings to processing with respect to temporal self
location.
The parietal part of the TPJ (the inferior parietal lobule: IPL) has
been shown to be involved in a number of different time estimation tasks.
Thus, lesions in this area and the prefrontal cortex have been shown to
be critical for time discrimination and estimation deficits of several sec-
onds [59,60]. The IPL was also found to be activated in sensorimotor syn-
chronization tasks (of several seconds) [61,62], in time estimation tasks (of
several seconds) [63–65] and in temporal discrimination (of milliseconds)
[66–70], rhythm discrimination [71,72] and time counting (of hundreds mil-
liseconds) [73]. Rubia and Smith [58] linked the involvement of IPL in
time management to its role in attentional processing. However, as time-
processing is an integral part of self-processing [56], we here speculate that
the IPL (and TPJ) is one of the modules recruited for the integration of
temporal self-processing. Thus, the TPJ is involved in immediate time
management, i.e. seconds and hundreds of milliseconds, and especially in
time-estimation and time-discrimination tasks and not (or less) in other
time-processing aspects which are not connected to self-processing (like
motor timing, pure time synchronisation or long time estimation) [58–60].
Despite this involvement of the TPJ in time-processing, these short
time judgement of periods cannot easily be linked to the abnormal time-
processing observed during AP that were experienced as spanning longer
time periods and timelessness. Yet, this link might be provided by other
studies that have investigated longer time periods as in autobiographical
memory. Thus, the TPJ has been found to be activated in memory retrieval
studies that use either PET [74–76], fMRI [77] or EEG [78], as a part of an
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autobiographical memory network that is composed by different structures
in the frontal and temporal cortex as well as the hippocampus [74,79]. The
right TPJ has also been shown to be involved in autobiographical episodic
memory retrieval [74,77]. Interestingly, using PET during memory retrieval,
Maguire and Mummery [80] differentiated between self-relevant (personal)
memories with a specific time-location (personal/time; autobiographical
events), self-relevant memories without time-location (personal/non-time;
autobiographical facts), non-self-relevant memories with time-location (non-
personal/time; public events) and non-self-relevant memories without time-
location (non-personal/non-time; general knowledge).e Different activations
were found for the different types of memories. Most interesting with re-
spect to the present considerations, the TPJ activation showed a differential
response to personal memories (personal) but did not discriminate between
autobiographical events and facts (time and non-time), i.e. the TPJ was
activated during personal memories independent of whether there was a
time locus or not. In contrast, the medial frontal cortex, the hippocam-
pus, and the temporal pole showed enhanced activity for stimuli that were
personally relevant and had a specific locus in time (personal/time).f
In addition to the implication of the TPJ in AP, temporal processes
and autobiographical memory, there are other neurological conditions that
might help understanding the temporal disunity in AP,g such as sponta-
neous confabulations and delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS).
Confabulations have been defined as false memories occurring in clear con-
sciousness in association with an organically derived amnesia [81]. Sponta-
neous confabulations act on the basis of previous habits rather than cur-
rently relevant memories. Thus, past true events and imaginations about
the future interfere with the experienced present (’now’) [22,23]. For in-
stance, a 58-year-old neurological patient was convinced that she had to feed
her baby, who was over 30 years old at the time [23,82]. It was suggested
that the anterior limbic system provides a reality monitoring mechanism
which selects memories of current relevance by suppressing (inactivating)
currently irrelevant memories. Lesion in this area might thus cause involve-
ment of irrelevant earlier (past) or imagined later (future) memories during
ePersonal/time vs. personal/non-time reminds the differentiation between episodic auto-
biographical memory (conscious recollection of a temporally and spatially specific events
from one’s personal past) and semantic autobiographical memory, which is time inde-
pendent [89,90].
fMaguire and Mummery [80] remark that the preference of the TPJ to personal memories
irrespective of temporal context has not been explored previously, but clearly requires
further investigation.
gFor a psychoanalytical explanation of AP in space and time see Rank [91].
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the current processing of events [22,23]. DMS are a group of delusional
disorders that involve a belief that the identity of a person, object or place
has been changed or altered. Briefly, DMS include the syndrome of Cap-
gras (the belief that (usually) a close relative or spouse has been replaced
by an identical-looking impostor), the syndrome of Fregoli (the belief that
various people that the believer has met are actually the same person in dif-
ferent disguises), the syndrome of intermetamorphosis (the belief that peo-
ple in the environment switch identities with each other while maintaining
the same appearance), the syndrome of subjective and inanimate doubles
(AP or multiple duplications of oneself), and the syndrome of reduplicative
paramnesias (the belief that a familiar event or place has been duplicated)
[20,21,83,84]. Moreover, the different subtypes of DMS might co-appear
[20,21,85]. Thus, although most authors think that reduplification of events
concerns only the event and not the self [20,84], the above reports and the
co-appearance of subtypes in DMS suggest that DMS might combine AP
with delusions of temporal-reduplication or event reduplification (i.e. age-
difference between original body and autoscopic body). With respect to the
anatomy of DMS, clinical and experimental evidence suggests that multifo-
cal brain damage is necessary. Thus, right-posterior brain damage has been
reported leading to deficits in visuo-spatial orientation and visual recogni-
tion. Also, the frequently associated bilateral frontal lobe pathology might
be responsible for the patient’s inability to correct the reduplicative phe-
nomenon in the face of otherwise adequate mnemonic function, thus avoids
correction by former knowledge and compensation mechanisms [21,83]. The
above reviewed phenomena of AP, spontaneous confabulations, and DMS
demonstrate that our immediate experience of being temporally located in
the present moment, in a specific ‘now’, passing forward with time in an
irreversible process depends on a variety of functions and brain areas. We
suggest that the breakdown of the “now” in AP can be systematically ex-
amined leading to the description of some of the underlying functional and
neural mechanisms of temporal self location.
5 Conclusion
In summary, our non-conceptual experience of self location inside our body
and “inside” the present moment might be abnormal in various neurologi-
cal conditions such as DMS, spontaneous confabulations and AP. The later
are divided into AH/HAS, during which subjects experience seeing an au-
toscopic body from their habitual and embodied perspective, and OBEs,
during which subjects appear to see the autoscopic body from a disembod-
ied perspective. Our analysis showed that the abnormal spatial location
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of body and self during AP is sometimes accompanied by an abnormal
temporal disunity of body and self.
Our analysis showed that OBE-subjects frequently report a sensation
of “timelessness” as if seeing the passage of time from an outer point-
of-view. We named this experience “Out-of-Time Experience” or OTE.
We suggest that the spatial coordinates of the self (with respect to the
body) and temporal aspects of the self (with respect to the present) share
important characteristics because the experience of being outside of one’s
body (OBE) was found to be associated with the experience of being outside
of the present moment (OTE). This suggests that the experience of the self
in space and time might share functional mechanisms at the TPJ and other
areas.
With respect to AH/HAS we did not encounter OTEs. Rather, the sub-
jects reported being in the present moment, but experienced the autoscopic
body as older or younger than the physical body. This suggests a differ-
ently disturbed self location in AH/HAS. Here, the double (or autoscopic
body) is sometimes experienced as being displaced into the future (older
autoscopic body) or the past (younger autoscopic body) showing again (as
in OBE/OTE) that the spatial coordinates of the self and temporal aspects
of the self share important functional mechanisms at the TPJ. Thus, the
self is experienced as being embodied and in the present, whereas the auto-
scopic body is experienced as being in extrapersonal space and as coming
from past or future.
The implication of the TPJ and especially the IPL (1) in time estimation
and discrimination, (2) its involvement in autobiographical memory (inde-
pendent of the autobiographical event’s locus in time), (3) together with
its central role in spatial self location and AP suggests that these abnormal
experiences of the body and self in time might also be due to interference
with the TPJ. The implication of many other brain areas and especially
the prefrontal cortex in autobiographical memory, DMS, and spontaneous
confabulations demonstrates that location of the self in time and space
is not only processed at the TPJ, but in a largely distributed network.
Whereas the implication of the different parts of the network certainly de-
pend on the task or action the subject is performing, the reviewed clinical
and neuroimaging data suggest that the TPJ plays a key role in spatial and
temporal self location. We hope that the reviewed data will lead to further
inquiries about how the brain generates our everyday experience of being
placed in our body at the present moment.
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Appendix A: Therapeutic Considerations
Tsuruta [86] noticed that schizophrenic patients who believe to be in a
different age than their chronological one might get an advantage from the
phenomenon, as “believing in their subjective age seems to allow them
to reunify or rewrite their own past history and gain some hope for the
future”. The psychotherapeutic method of hermeneutic re-biography uses
similar conditions. The method tries to repair the past by re-reading the
patient’s history from a different temporal point of view, and then to shape
the future accordingly [87,88]. However, how is the therapeutic-migrating
through rereading of past failure possible without changing facts or events?
And how can one write a script of one’s future realistically? Rotenberg
suggests that “we must realize that we can understand the possibility of
dialogue between one’s past “I” and one’s future “I” only in terms of the
balance between the finite rational-material and the infinite mystic-spiritual
conceptions of life that prevail in particular cultures” [88, p. 180]. The
reviewed data suggest that the neurocognitive phenomena of AP facilitate
such changes in temporal self location.
In AP one may see his double in the past or in the future, under posi-
tive or negative circumstances. Thus, case 10 of the current study faces his
younger double, who helps him to get back his force and fight his unwilled
position (past, positive). Case 3 hears from his younger double that the
temporary reading of his life is a failure (past, negative). The dialogue
with the past double may lead to a new reading of the self biography. Case
2 sees his imagined future double broken and ill (future, negative). The
manifestation of such a future should lead the subject to change his way of
life. On the other hand, Case 8’s double is coming from the future, show-
ing the subject a possible, recommended future (future, positive). Thus,
AP with age-difference between the original body and the autoscopic body
claim for open future and past and suggest alternative probable outcomes,
thus assist re-biographing mental states.
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Table A.1. Phenomenological findings of Autoscopic Phenomena and time-experience.
(AP = Autoscopic Phenomena; HAS = HeAutoScopy; AH = Autoscopic Hallucination;
OBE = Out-of-Body Experience; DP = Depersonalization; DE = Disembodiment; n.r.
= not reported)
Subj. Ref. AP DP DE Time of Action Speech
# Double
1 [36] AH ± − past n.r. −
HAS
2 [37] AH − − future walking +
3 [31] AH − ± past − +
4 [41] AH − − past running, n.r
laughing
5 [42] OBE + + timeless − −
(11 subj’s)
6 [43; C1] OBE + + timeless − −
7 [43; C2] OBE + + timeless − −
8 [24] AH − − near moving −
future the lawn
9 [44] OBE n.r. n.r. timeless − −
10 [13] HAS + − past fighting +
Subject’s Double’s Gender Weak Fear Surprise Vestib.
Position Position Manifest.
n.r.supine standing m double n.r. − ±
standing standing m + n.r. n.r. n.r.
sitting sitting m n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
− standing f n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
n.r. n.r n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. +
n.r. n.r n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. +
n.r. n.r n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. +
n.r. standing m n.r. n.r. + n.r.
n.r. n.r n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. +
sitting standing m + + + +
